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COMMENTS

ARE YOU STILL MASTER OF YOUR
DOMAIN? ABUSES OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS, AND
MICHIGAN'S RETURN TO "PUBLIC USE" IN
COUNTY OF WAYNE V. HATHCOCK
PETER M. AGNETTIt

INTRODUCTION

One of the most awesome powers of government is the ability
to condemn and take privately owned property through eminent
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
domain.'
Constitution restricts the power of eminent domain, prohibiting
2
the taking of private property unless it is for public use. This
restraint on government takings is substantively applied to the

t J.D. Candidate, June 2006, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2000,
State University of New York at Geneseo.
1 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 1 (2003), available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED-report.pdf ("Eminent domain has the
potential to destroy lives and livelihoods by uprooting people from their homes and
businesspeople from their shops."); Tony Mauro, Land Case Is a Hot Property,LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2004, at 12 (discussing the importance of determining limits on "one
of the most awesome powers a government has at its disposal," eminent domain).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (placing two constraints on the power of eminent
domain: (1) "[n]o person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"; and (2) "[n]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"). This second constraint contains the Public Use Clause, which
mandates that any taking of private property must be justified with a valid benefit
being accrued to the public. See id. The analysis of this Comment will concentrate on
the taking of private property for a purported "public use" and the various legislative
and judicial meanings given to this term.
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several states through the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Many state
constitutions similarly limit eminent domain to those takings
justified by public use. 4
Notwithstanding constitutional
limitations, the power of eminent domain has been widely used
by state and federal legislatures for various public purposes,
including urban
renewal
and
economic
development.5
Traditionally, eminent domain has been employed to condemn
and take private property for improvements such as railroads,
utilities, and other infrastructures, and was justified on the
theory that the general public would be the beneficiaries of the
takings through literal public use.6 However, with states and
municipalities eager to generate higher tax revenues through
economic redevelopment,
private real property owners
nationwide are increasingly finding their non-blighted, middleclass properties appropriated and transferred over to commercial
and residential developers for profit-making ventures.7
Facilitating the process, the United States Supreme Court
has given free reign to state governments to devise legislative
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 244
n.7 (1984) (stating that the Fifth Amendment's Public Use requirement "is made
binding on the States only by incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Eminent
Domain Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); see also
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 711, 716
(1999).
4 See, e.g., infra note 26 (discussing Michigan's constitutional
restraints on
eminent domain).
5 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954) (declaring
the
constitutionality of eminent domain for the purpose of urban renewal, which was
meant to regenerate Washington D.C.'s inner-city areas by eliminating slums and
removing blight); see also Wendell E. Pritchett, The 'Public Menace" of Blight:
Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1, 1-2 (2003) (noting how Berman highlighted the "struggle to balance the rights of
individual property owners against societal interests in the development, or
protection, of scarce resources").
6 See James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "DespoticPower" Be Tamed? Reconsidering
the
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, PROB. & PROP., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 30, 31
(stating that eminent domain was historically used "to provide public facilities, such
as roads, parks, and military installations"); Pritchett, supra note 5, at 9 ("[Sluch
takings were approved on the theory that the fruits of the takings would be available
to the general public."); M. Robert Goldstein & Michael Rikon, 'Public Use'
Redefined, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 2004, at 3 (explaining that the taking of property by
eminent domain "originally contemplated the taking for the literal use of the
public"); see also infra note 34 (discussing the traditional definition of public use).
7 See Mauro, supra note 1 (noting that home owners nationwide are
finding
their "unblighted properties seized and turned over to commercial and residential
developers" due to municipalities' eagerness to generate higher tax revenues
through redevelopment).
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8
takings. The pioneering cases of Berman v. Parker, Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,9 and a Michigan Supreme Court
10
case, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, shifted
the understanding of the term "public use" and practically
relegated the Public Use Clause to a distant memory." As a
result, over the past few decades many state courts and
legislatures have come to interpret the state and federal public
use clauses in a manner that allows state and municipal
governments to condemn and take private property for virtually
any reason provided there is a somewhat rationally stated
2 Solidifying
economic benefit in store for the government fisc.'
the demise of federal constitutional protection through the Public
Use Clause, the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of
New London,' 3 held that the taking of private property by a state
to promote economic development "unquestionably serves a
public purpose," and hence satisfies the public use requirement of
the Fifth Amendment.' 4 As a result of Kelo, the states, through
their own constitutional or statutory restraints, are now the sole
protectors of private property owners from the threat of eminent
domain exercised upon the rationale of economic development. 15

8 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
9 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
10 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
11 See infra Part II (discussing the legal analysis provided by the United States
Supreme Court for determining if a particular use of eminent domain satisfies the
Public Use Clause).
12 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (holding that the federal Public Use Clause will
not prohibit a taking as long as "the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose"); see also BERLINER, supranote 1,
at 1 (revealing that the present trend is for local and state governments to use

eminent domain "for casino[s], condominiums or

...

private office building[s] . . . as

part of corporate welfare incentive packages and deals for more politically favored
businesses"); Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making Eminent Domain Humane, 49
VILL. L. REV. 207, 208 (2004) (arguing that judicial interpretation of the public use
requirement has "renderfed] it meaningless" by allowing private property to be
taken "for any reason whatsoever, including crass political purposes or speculative,
transient economic purposes"). Criticism of such condemnations with virtually no
limit has come from both ends of the political spectrum. See id. at 223
("Conservatives object to government coercion and disrespect for private property in
service of speculative claims about the public good. Liberals object to the exercise of
government authority on behalf of the powerful and at the expense of the
powerless.").
13 545 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
14 Id. at 2664-65.
15 See id. at 2668 ("We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any
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Despite the Kelo precedent and the trend among state
legislatures to expand the traditional meaning of the Public Use
Clause, several recent state and federal court decisions have
successfully reined in expansive executions of eminent domain
power.16
Recently, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,1 7 the
Michigan Supreme Court has seemingly given hope to private
owners of real property by providing a "public use" standard for
government takings that are done primarily to benefit other
private entities.1 8 The court held that Michigan municipalities
do not have the power under the state's Public Use Clause to
condemn private property for the purpose of transfer to another
private party in order to spur economic development, except
under exceptional circumstances.19
State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power."). But see
id. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (positing that the suggestion by the Court that
property owners must rely on the states to determine limits on economic

development takings "is an abdication of [the Supreme Court's] responsibility").
"States play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty, but
compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution (and a
provision meant to curtail state action, no less) is not among them." Id.
16 See, e.g., Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218
F.
Supp. 2d 1203, 1229-30 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (barring the City of Cypress, California
from condemning church property so it could be sold to Costco by granting an
injunction, in part, because of the likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiffs
takings claims on public use grounds); Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 904 (Ariz. 2003)
(prohibiting the use of eminent domain by the City of Mesa to take property from a
brake shop owner for the primary benefit of Ace Hardware, and holding that
"[Arizona's] constitutional requirement of 'public use' is only satisfied when the
public benefits and characteristics of the intended use substantially predominate
over the private nature of that use"). Not all state courts, however, have been
equally as critical of their legislature's definition of "public use." See Kelo v. City of
New London, 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004) (holding that economic development
projects "that have the public economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing tax
and other revenues, and contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the public use
clauses of the state and federal constitutions"), affid, 545 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2655
(2005); W. 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 298 A.D.2d 1, 5-7, 744
N.Y.S.2d 121,124 (1st Dep't 2002) (upholding the use of eminent domain to condemn
a city block consisting of several profitable office buildings in New York City's Times
Square in order to provide property to the New York Times to build a new
headquarters). Likewise, federal courts now must defer to the central holding of Kelo
that takings for the purpose of economic development are justified under the federal
Constitution. See Calhoun Realty, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:03-CV-00198,
2005 WL 2000664, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2005) (holding that "[t]he precedent in
Kelo applies since [d]efendants' goals for taking the property are to promote
economic development").
17 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
18 See infra Part I (discussing the analysis in Hathcock).
19 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-83, 787. The special circumstances given by
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In Hathcock, the Wayne County legislature (the "County")
sought to condemn the defendants' property in order to develop
and establish a 1300-acre business and technology park
("Pinnacle Project") adjacent to the recently expanded
Metropolitan Airport. 20 The purpose of the park was to boost the
local economy by generating new employment opportunities and
a higher tax-base for the local government. 2 1 The County was
able to procure most of the property needed to develop the new
park, but still needed to acquire an additional 300 acres to
complete its land assembly objective. 22 The County then adopted
legislation 23 authorizing the acquisition of the remaining 300
acres desired for the Pinnacle Project. 24 Appraisal-based offers
were delivered to the remaining property owners, and although
25
some offers were accepted, the defendants chose not to sell.
Unable to secure voluntary sales from the defendants, the

the court under which eminent domain can legitimately be exercised for the benefit
of a private entity will be discussed in Part I. As noted above, as a result of the Kelo
decision, property owners can now look only to their state's constitution for
protection from economic development takings. The Kelo ruling has no binding
influence on a state's interpretation of its own constitutional protections. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
20 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770. Wayne County received a grant of $21
million from the Federal Aviation Agency to partially fund a program to purchase
properties neighboring the new terminal and runway of the Metropolitan Airport.
See id. This was done in an effort to abate any inconvenience to local homeowners as
a result of enhanced noise from the increased air traffic at the airport. See id. The
County was able to purchase 500 of the 1300 acres needed through the noise
abatement program, and only when it needed further assembly of land to build the
park did it turn to eminent domain. See id. at 771. Hence, it seems that the County
was proposing to protect private homeowners from bothersome airport noise by
condemning their property.
21 See id. at 770-71. The County claimed that the technology park would
"enhance the image" of the community and "attract national and international
businesses." Id.; cf. Kelo, 843 A.2d at 542-43 (finding a valid public use based on
similar benefits to the community). The County also supplied expert testimony that
claimed the proposed project would create 30,000 jobs and generate an additional
$350 million in annual tax revenue. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
22 The County acquired 500 acres through the noise abatement program and an
additional 500 acres through solicitation of voluntary sales. See Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d at 771.
23 The law was named the Resolution of Necessity and Declaration of Taking.
See id.
24 See id.
25 See id. There were a total of nineteen outstanding parcels owned by the
defendants. See id. The defendants' parcels were dispersed throughout the desired
300-acre area in a checkerboard pattern. See id. at 770.
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County initiated condemnation actions. 26 The trial court, in an
unpublished opinion, held that the Pinnacle Project served a
valid public purpose under the controlling constitutional
27
jurisprudence, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed.
28
Applying the standard set forth by the dissent in Poletown,
the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower

26 See id. at 771. The condemnation actions were initiated by the County under
the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act. See id.; MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 213.51213.76 (2004). Each of the defendant property owners filed a motion to review the
actual necessity of the proposed condemnations. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
The defendants had three arguments: first, that there was no statutory authority for
eminent domain in their cases; second, that the condemnations were not necessary
as required by the statute; and third, that the condemnations were unconstitutional
because the Pinnacle Project lacked a valid public use. See id. This Comment will
concentrate on the third argument, as that focuses on the definition of public use in
a constitutional sense. It should be noted that the Hathcock court based its decision
and definition of public use on its interpretation of the Michigan State Constitution.
See id. at 779; see also MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a
manner prescribed by law."). Michigan's Constitution, therefore, provides an
adequate and independent state ground for the Hathcock decision, precluding review
by the United States Supreme Court. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead
Stars: The ProceduralAdequate and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1888-89 (2003) (explaining how the adequate and
independent state ground doctrine protects state court decisions that rest on state
law from federal review). States are free to grant more protections than those
afforded by the Federal Constitution, but are prohibited from granting less. See
Shirley S. Abrahamson, State ConstitutionalLaw, New JudicialFederalism, and the
Rehnquist Court, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 345-46 (2004). However, because
Michigan's Public Use Clause is nearly identical to that of the United States
Constitution and similar to those of the constitutions of virtually every other state,
an analysis of the Hathcock court's reasoning will prove fruitful for future state and
federal undertakings to define "public use." See Timothy Sandefur, A NaturalRights
Perspective on Eminent Domain in California:A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial
Scrutiny of "PublicUse," 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 569-70 (2003).
27 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771-72. The trial court rendered its decision
under the analysis of the then-controlling law of Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). The Poletown court held that the City of
Detroit was permitted to condemn private residential properties in order to convey
those properties to General Motors, a private corporation, for the construction of an
assembly plant. See id.; see also infra Part I. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed on the same grounds but argued that Poletown was "poorly reasoned,
wrongly decided, and ripe for reversal by [the Michigan Supreme Court]." See
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771-72.
28 In his dissent in Poletown, Justice Ryan laid out three possible characteristics
of a governmental taking for the benefit of a private corporation that would satisfy
the constitutional definition of public use. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 477-78
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
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court. 29 In his dissent in Poletown, Justice Ryan explained that
there are three elements that "justify[] the use of eminent
domain for private corporations:
1) public necessity of the
extreme sort, 2) continuing accountability to the public, and 3)
selection of land according to facts of independent public
significance." 30 Adopting these elements, the Hathcock court first
reasoned that the Pinnacle Project was "certainly not an
enterprise 'whose very existence depends on the use of land that
can be assembled only by the coordination central government
alone is capable of achieving."' 3'
Next, the court stated that
because the Pinnacle Project was not subject to sufficient public
oversight, there was no guarantee that the venture would
contribute the anticipated long term benefits to the local
economy. 32
Finally, the court asserted that although
enhancement of economic conditions is an appropriate public
purpose, the underlying purpose of the Pinnacle Project did not
serve the public good independent of the benefits conferred by the
private corporations through post-condemnation development.3 3
By overruling Poletown, the Hathcock court partially
restored, at least in Michigan, the definition of "public use" to the
rational meaning intended by those who drafted and ratified the
34
public use clauses in the federal and various state constitutions.
See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478
(Ryan, J., dissenting)); see also infra Part L.A (analyzing the first exception to the
general requirement of literal public use when using the power of eminent domaininstrumentalities of commerce).
32 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784. Rather than ensuring public oversight, the
court found that the County planned to take the defendants' property and transfer it
to private corporations that planned "to pursue their own financial welfare with the
single-mindedness expected of any profit-making enterprise." See id.; see also infra
Part I.B (analyzing the second exception-public oversight).
33 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784; see also infra Part I.C (analyzing the third
exception- public good).
34 For an originalist interpretation of the term "public use," Justice Thomas
provided a valuable tutorial in his Kelo dissent: "The most natural reading of the
[Public Use] Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the
government owns, or the public has a legal right to use, the property, as opposed to
taking it for any public purpose or necessity whatsoever." Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas then explained that the noun "use" was understood by the Founding
Fathers as '[t]he act of employing any thing to any purpose."' Id. (quoting S.
29

30
31

JOHNSON,

A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2194

(4th ed.

1773))

(alteration in original). "When the government takes property and gives it to a
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It is submitted, however, that the requirements test laid out by

the Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock still leaves too much
discretion with the legislature to take private property
unconstitutionally for others' private gain by relying on an
economic development rationale. Furthermore, the Hathcock
decision will likely send reverberations throughout the country,
despite the Supreme Court's holding in Kelo, because of
Poletown's vast and strong influence on other states in expanding
35
their own powers of eminent domain.
This Comment asserts that takings that do not fall within
one of the limited exceptions and which primarily benefit a
private entity at the expense of owners of non-blighted private
property not only fail to pass constitutional muster, but also work
in an economically inefficient manner so as to threaten
perpetually all ownership of real property in the United States.
Far from being a discourse on the evils of corporate exploitation,
this Comment will examine and criticize the public use
requirement of the Hathcock court, which revitalized, albeit
incompletely, the "dead-letter" of the Public Use Clause in
Michigan.
Part I will analyze the Hathcock checks on
government takings and distinguish them from the unfettered
discretion given to municipalities by other states and,
unquestionably, by United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Part I also offers ideas on how states can ensure the receipt of
the public benefits promised by the private beneficiaries of
eminent domain, and will show how the use of eminent domain to
eliminate alleged "blight" can manipulatively be used
interchangeably with the economic development rationale
overruled by Hathcock and upheld by Kelo. Part I further will
propose suggestions for further state restrictions that should be
private individual, and the public has no right to use the property, it strains
language to say that the public is 'employing' the property, regardless of the
incidental benefits that might accrue to the public from the private use." Id. Finally,
Justice Thomas asserted that "[tlhe term 'public use,' then, means that either the
government or its citizens as a whole must actually 'employ' the taken property." Id.
"The Public Use Clause, in short, embodied the Framers' understanding that
property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the government from 'tak[ing]
property from A. and giv[ing] it to B."' Id. at 2680 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)) (alteration in original).
35 See Dean Starkman, Michigan Upholds Property Rights In Broad Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at A6 (noting how the Hathcock decision will have broad
impact because other state courts have long relied on Poletown to justify
condemnations made pursuant to an economic development rationale).
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imposed on government condemnations, particularly in the wake
of Kelo's grant of discretion. Part II briefly advocates the need
for meaningful state judicial review of what opportunistic
legislatures deem to be a "public use." The Comment concludes
with a look at recent public reaction and political responses to
economic development takings.
I. HATHCOCkIS THREE EXCEPTIONS FOR THE USE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN THAT PRIMARILY BENEFITS PRIVATE PARTIES

Although undoubtedly disappointing to state and municipal
legislatures looking to give a shot in the arm to the local
economy, Hathcock's overruling of Poletown certainly appears to
36
be encouraging news to owners of real property in Michigan.
Hathcock has refuted the idea that a "generalized economic
benefit" to a private corporation is sufficient to satisfy Michigan's
The court explained how Poletown
Public Use Clause.3 7
endangered private property
and
continually
erroneously
ownership:
Poletown's "economic benefit" rationale would validate
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on
behalf of a private entity. After all, if one's ownership of private
property is forever subject to the government's determination
that another private party would put one's land to better use,
then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by
the expansion plans of any large discount retailer, "megastore,"
38
or the like.
The continuous threat of arbitrarily losing one's property
because someone else can use it more profitably intuitively
promotes economic inefficiency by discouraging the purchase of
private property. 39 After all, with no protection from a well36 Property owners in other states should also be encouraged due to Poletown's
vast influence on other states' expansion of public use to include generalized
economic benefits to a beneficiary private corporation. See supra note 35 (discussing
Poletown's national influence). Any optimism, however, must be tapered by the lack
of federal constitutional protection. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
37 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786 ("Before Poletown, we had never held that a
private entity's pursuit of profit was a 'public use' for constitutional takings purposes
simply because one entity's profit maximization contributed to the health of the
general economy.").
38 Id.

39 See Dana Berliner, You Can't Go Home Again, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at
42 (noting how private property can never be deemed secure if it can be condemned
under any rationale that relies on its transferee's ability to use the property in a
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financed developer, it's much less appealing to buy in the first
place if the purchase is conditioned on the buyer using the
property in a manner that is most financially rewarding to the
state. However, Hathcock did not completely bar the use of
eminent domain for the benefit of another private party. As will
be discussed below, there are three exceptions under Hathcock
that allow for government takings to subsidize a private
corporation.
A. The Instrumentalitiesof Commerce/Public Necessity
Exception
In some situations, a public or private project affecting the
instrumentalities of commerce cannot be accomplished without
the taking of a particular parcel of land. In such cases, eminent
domain is needed to provide a resolution. 40 Such projects may
include a private railroad or public highway that, due to
geographical constraints, needs to run directly through a
privately owned piece of real estate. 41
In Hathcock, the
proponents of the Pinnacle Project could not show that the
technology park was unable to be constructed but for the

more lucrative manner).
40 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (referring to this prerequisite context as a

"public necessity of the extreme sort"). In his dissent in Poletown, Justice Ryan
stated that within the court's historical jurisprudence, "the exercise of eminent
domain for private corporations has been limited to those enterprises generating
public benefits whose very existence depends on the use of land that can be
assembled only by the coordination central government alone is capable of
achieving." Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
41 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (describing Justice Ryan's list that includes
"highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce"' as
illustrations of public necessities (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting))); see also Ely, supra note 6, at 33 (stating that during the industrial
revolution, state and federal courts repeatedly upheld legislation that allowed
private railroads "to appropriate private property"). Such takings for the benefit of
private entities were rationalized on the theory that railroads, which were analogous
to public highways, furthered the "public purpose of improving [interstate]
transportation." See id. This analogy between private railroads and public highways
commenced a line of thinking that "began to conflate public use with the more
expansive concept of public interest or public benefit." See id; see also Thomas W.
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV 61, 64 (1986) (discussing
how many courts have shifted their focus from "property rules," which grant
injunctive relief because of the questionable means used to take private property, to
"liability rules," which grant compensation while solely concentrating on the stated
ends of the taking).
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exclusive use of the defendants' private property. 42 As courts
have interpreted it, the public necessity exception is a legitimate,
widely accepted use of eminent domain. 43 The ability to condemn
private property for a genuine public use affecting the
instrumentalities of commerce, as traditionally understood, is not
in dispute and not within the scope of this Comment. 44 The final
two exceptions provided by the court, however, leave considerable
room for abuse under the very economic development rationale
overruled by the Hathcock court.
B. The Public Oversight/AccountabilityException
The Hathcock court explained that eminent domain may be
used primarily to benefit a private corporation "when the private
entity remains accountable to the public in its use of that
The municipality must put in place "formal
property."45
mechanisms ... to ensure that the businesses that ...[receive
properties ... continue to
the benefit of the condemned]
contribute to the health of the local economy." 46 The court noted
42 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783-84 (explaining that shopping centers, office
parks, hotels, and the like do not need eminent domain for their construction,
notwithstanding their lack of characterization as instrumentalities of commerce).
43 See, e.g., City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children's Funded Trust, 701 N.W.2d
144, 147 (Mich. 2005) (holding that, even under the narrow standards of the
Hathcock decision, the City's taking of private property to build a road, which was to
be open to the public but primarily used by a private entity that helped finance the
project, satisfies the public use requirement).
44 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at _, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2681
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (conceding the necessity of eminent domain and
explaining that historically states used takings "to provide quintessentially public
goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks");
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (stating that it is
beyond question that Congress has the power to adopt public policies "authoriz[ing]
the taking of private property for public use"). Indeed, forbidding government
intervention in situations affecting the instrumentalities of commerce would likely
erect serious economic and practical roadblocks in the form of bilateral monopolies.
See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-82 (explaining the problem of bilateral monopoly,
where a land owner in the path of a proposed railroad track could refuse to sell his
land for less than fifty times its appraised value, thereby creating a deadlock); see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55 (6th ed. 2003) (arguing
that due to the high transaction costs resulting from bilateral monopolies faced with
right-of-way companies, such as railroads, eminent domain is necessary "to shift
resources to a more valuable use, because the market is by definition unable to
perform this function in those settings").
45 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
46 Id. at 784. Unlike the Michigan Constitution, the U.S. Constitution requires
no such 'reasonable certainty' that the expected public benefits will actually
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that the Pinnacle Project, like the General Motors manufacturing
plant in Poletown, was not subject to any public oversight to
ensure that the benefits emanating from the property continued
to accrue to the community. 47 The court gave some examples of
what does and does not constitute public oversight, but left
readers and real property owners guessing as to how liberally
this exception will be applied by the judiciary. 48
There are several ways that the public oversight
requirement can be accomplished. For instance, one method
might be requiring a beneficiary corporation to promise a
requisite number of jobs and tax dollars. However, no matter
how optimistic such promises may be, they are merely
speculative. 49 The Hathcock court paid "lip service" to this
problem, stating that "[t]o justify the exercise of eminent domain
solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that
property... might contribute to the economy's health is to
render impotent our constitutional limitations on the
government's power of eminent domain." 50 The court, however,
failed to give municipalities that are truly interested in serving
accrue." Kelo, 545 U.S.

-,

125 S. Ct. at 2667. The Court in Kelo reasoned that "[a]

constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every
condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would
unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of
many such plans." Id. at 2668. Apparently, the Kelo Court was more concerned with
expediting the taking process than ensuring the purported economic benefits of the
plan to the public.
47 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
48 See id. at 782. As an example of what does not constitute public oversight, the
court mentioned a case where the private entity, a power utility, would 'own, lease,
use, and control" the land and the water power emanating from the land. See id.
(quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 479
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)). As an example of valid public oversight, the court
mentioned a case where the state retained control of a petroleum pipeline. See id. In
that case: (1) the private beneficiary corporation guaranteed that it would transport
petroleum in intrastate commerce; (2) the corporation's plans were subject to
directions from the state; and (3) the state was able to enforce those obligations. Id.
It should be noted that the latter example may fall under the instrumentalities of
commerce exception. See supra Part I.A.
49 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 220. In Poletown, the majority
conceded that the public benefits promised "cannot be speculative or marginal but
must be clear and significant." Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460. Still, the Poletown
court accepted General Motors's highly speculative claims. See Nader & Hirsch,
supra note 12, at 219 (pointing out this contradiction in Poletown).
50 Hathcock, 686 N.W.2d at 786 (emphasis added); see Nader & Hirsch, supra
note 12, at 219.
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the public good through economic stimulation a solution to this
dilemma. 51 A municipality that transfers private property to a
private entity at a favorable price in return for speculative
promises should retain more control than the abstract ability to
enforce any promised obligations. After all, individuals' personal
52
When weighing the
residences are potentially at stake.
interests of private persons and their residences (or their private
commercial real estate) against speculative gains for the
community at large, a more exacting standard should be used.
1. Alternatives for Enforcing Speculative Promises Through
Public Oversight
To guard against the risk that speculative claims may fail to
come to fruition, a number of objective safety measures may be
put in place by the state judiciary or legislature. For example,
where eminent domain is used to transfer private property to a
private entity vowing to provide economic stimulus, the
probability of that stimulus should be demonstrated to the
53
The next logical question
satisfaction of objective experts.
are vouched for by an
benefits
purported
becomes: Even if the
private entity, what
the
by
expert witness and guaranteed
happens if the entity fails to perform? The Hathcock court made
no mention of any bona fide ramifications for entities that fail to
54
meet their promised obligations. Furthermore, even if the state
51 As discussed in note 48, the examples given by the court for the public

oversight exception appear to involve projects that would fall under the first
exception, which allows eminent domain to be used to benefit private parties when
dealing with instrumentalities of commerce. Assuming the court meant that this
second exception is only available for public utilities and the like, the economic
development rationale put forth by the County would not be valid even if sufficient
public oversight were available. Because the Hathcock court was unclear as to
whether the second exception could apply to entities other than public utilities, this
Comment assumes that this exception may apply to other entities as well and will
explore the alternative means available for ensuring public oversight of transfers to
these entities.
52 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (discussing how a
person's personal residence can be his or her "single most valuable and cherished
asset" and how a stable community can be an "unchanging symbol of the security
and quality of [life]"); see also Nader & Hirsh, supra note 12, at 216 (noting that
"property can be a foundation for 'self-determination and self-expression,' and
'personal property' can be inseparable from liberty").
53 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 230.
54 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784. The Hathcock court noted that at the trial
court level, expert testimony anticipated that the Pinnacle Project would create
30,000 jobs and add $350 million in tax revenue for the County. See id. at 771.
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retains the right to enforce the obligations through contractual
remedies, it cannot be expected, as a practical matter, to be able
to force a private retailer or technology park to hire more
workers or sell more of its product so as to increase its taxable
income.
One solution to this predicament is to use a legal device to
deprive the beneficiary corporation of the benefit received by the
taking if the promises do not pan out.
The contractual
commitment can be given some teeth by including a "claw back"
provision, under which the beneficiary corporation, in the event
it fails to deliver on its promises, is required to pay the
municipality the equivalent of any benefits received in return for
such promises. 55 Another solution is to grant the beneficiary
corporation a defeasible estate or to impose some type of
restrictive covenant in the deed. For example, the municipality
could transfer the land subject to the condition that the land be
used only for the specific purposes needed to fulfill the promised
benefits.56 Retention of the fee could be further conditioned on
actually meeting the promised employment opportunities and tax
revenue. In the alternative, an affirmative restrictive covenant
could be used as an incentive for the corporation to provide the
promised economic benefits. 57 Under such a restrictive covenant,
the corporation would be compelled to use the land only in a
manner consistent with its promised goals. Other possible
options include restrictive covenants like those found under
limited profit housing laws. 58 Under such a conveyance, the
55 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 221 n.101, 230 (describing
the
characteristics of a "claw back" provision in the eminent domain context).
Concededly, none of these public oversight solutions will likely console the private
property owner whose home has been taken for private development.
56 There are two types of defeasible estates: the determinable fee and the fee
subject to condition subsequent. See, e.g., Mahrenholz v. County Bd. of Sch. Trustees
of Lawrence County, 417 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). Under the former, the
grantor retains a possibility of reverter, which confers on the grantor an immediate
reversion of the fee simple if the condition is broken. See id. Under the latter, the
grantor retains a right of reentry, which confers on the granter only the right to
retake the property, not an automatic reversion. See id.
57 Most jurisdictions in the United States subscribe to the
rule that such
affirmative burdens "run with the land." See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v.
Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 254, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1938). This
would prevent the corporation from avoiding the obligations in the covenant by
transferring the land to a related subsidiary or the like.
58 See, e.g., N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW §§ 10-37 (McKinney 2002); see
also John
R. Nolon, Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of Local
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beneficiary corporation would be prohibited from selling the
property it received at a price above that produced by a
prearranged formula. 59 This would deter the corporation from
closing up shop, reneging on its promises, and selling at a
substantial profit the property, which was transferred to it at a
favorable price. The state could also merely grant a leasehold
interest to the corporation with an option to purchase contingent
60 Whatever the method
upon it meeting the promised benefits.
used, some legal device must be used to hold accountable the
private beneficiary of the eminent domain.
2. A Uniform Federal Standard on Public Oversight
Even the preceding proposed safeguards may be ineffective
without a uniform federal standard governing public oversight
provisions. 6 ' Absent such a standard, these safeguards may
actually have a counterproductive effect. In theory, companies
can be forced to keep their promises of jobs and tax revenues by
agreeing to pay a penalty of some kind or even to forfeit the
property if stated goals are not met. Although this contractual
arrangement may appear to be a panacea, in reality there is
nothing binding the potential developer or corporation to a
specific geographic area. In Poletown, for instance, General
Motors was clearly in the proverbial driver's seat vis-A-vis the
City of Detroit, which was already in the middle of a severe

Government to Create Affordable Housing, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 383, 409-10 (1989)

(discussing the movement by New York State to encourage private enterprises to
develop housing for low- and middle-income persons). In 1955, in response to the
need for low-income housing, New York enacted the Limited-Profit Housing
Companies Law, popularly known as the Mitchell-Lama Program. See id. at 409-10
& n.131. The law authorized the state government to make 90%, 50-year loans to
limited-profit companies incorporated under the new Mitchell-Lama law, which
created a cooperative housing project. See id. at 409 n.131. Additionally, in order to
improve the quality of life in urban areas, the legislature made available tax
exemptions and long-term financing at favorable interest rates to low-income
cooperative tenants. See id. at 410 n.134.
59 See Nolon, supra note 58, at 410 n.134. The purpose of this formula is to
prevent the beneficiary developers or tenants from flipping their properties at a
large profit. See id. The resale price, subject to the approval of the commissioner of
housing, was to be "equal to the price paid by the selling tenant plus the cost of any
capital improvements plus a portion of the actual aggregate amortization paid on all
existing and prior mortgages plus reasonable administrative costs." See id.
60 See id. at 413 n.150.
61 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 230.
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economic downturn. 62 Had Detroit insisted on a guarantee of a
specific number of jobs and tax dollars per year, General Motors
would likely have skipped town to a friendlier state; one where
General Motors could cheaply purchase land or one that would
transfer land via eminent domain with no strings attached.
Thus, not only could a demand for guarantees or an agreement to
"claw back" provisions potentially push
developers out of a
particular jurisdiction, they could also create a "race to the
bottom" between states with friendly land transfer laws trying to
lure in private corporations. 63 For these reasons, a uniform
federal standard governing public oversight is necessary ensure
effective accountability measures.
C. The Public Good/Slum ClearanceException
The final exception addresses the situation where the
property itself is in such a condition that condemnation is in the
best interest of the public. The Hathcock court explained that
property may be condemned where "the selection of the land to be
62 In Poletown, General Motors was threatening to close
two plants in Detroit, a
city that was already in the midst of a major recession. See Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 467 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting),
overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). Such a
threat could not have resulted in an arm's-length transaction because the city was
desperate for economic stimulus and wanted to prevent local businesses from
leaving town. This reality coupled with the fact that General Motors was opposed by
low-income families suggests that the deck was stacked against the interests of the
homeowners. See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 226-27 ("[P]itting General
Motors against the elderly, unwealthy citizens of Poletown is like a football game
between Penn State and a junior college.").
63 See Nader & Hirsch, supra note 12, at 231 (hypothesizing that
the imposition
of a federal legislative standard would prevent state governments from the
undesirable "race to the bottom"). In Kelo, rather than providing a federal standard
governing the taking of private property for economic development, the United
States Supreme Court simply deferred to state legislatures. See Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) ("Just as we decline to secondguess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we
also decline to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to
acquire ...to effectuate the project."). Because Kelo presented virtually the same
fact pattern as Hathcock, the Supreme Court did not tackle the problem addressed
in Part I.C, i.e., the problem of dealing with the use of the "blight" designation by
legislatures in place of the economic development rationale. Concerning the "race to
the bottom" problem, it is less likely that a retail store or technology park developer,
who comes to the municipality for the locally originating sales, will have as much
leverage as companies like General Motors who use a manufacturing plant to
produce cars for sale nationwide. Such local businesses will, therefore, be less prone
to participate in a "race to the bottom."
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64
That is, the
condemned is itself based on public concern."
property chosen for condemnation is "selected on the basis of
'facts of independent public significance,' meaning that the
underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, rather than
the subsequent use of condemned land, must satisfy the
'65 In Hathcock, all of the
Constitution's public use requirement.
alleged benefits of the Pinnacle Project, including the new jobs
and tax revenue, were to arise after the land was seized by the
County and transferred to the private corporations developing
the property. 66 Therefore, the Pinnacle Project condemnations
did not fit into this seemingly narrow exception. Examples of
condemnations that do satisfy this exception are those made in
67
of "blighted"
furtherance of slum clearance or removal
property. 68 In the process of clearing so-called blighted property,
the public allegedly accrues the benefits of increased health and
safety, even if the property is later transferred to private real
estate developers. 69 However, since the Supreme Court's ruling
in Berman v. Parker, many states have been moving towards

County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782-83 (Mich. 2004).
Id. at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
66 See id. at 784. In her Kelo dissent, Justice O'Connor discussed the underlying
U.S.
principle of direct public benefit that was present in both Berman v.Parker, 348
Kelo,
See
(1984).
229
U.S.
467
Midkiff,
26 (1954), and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
cases, the
545 U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In both those
affirmative
inflicted
property
targeted
the
of
use
extraordinary, precondemnation
in
harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and
O'Connor
Justice
wealth.").
extreme
from
Midkiff through oligopoly resulting
convincingly pointed out that "[because each taking directly achieved a public
This
benefit, it did not matter that the property was turned over to private use." Id.
the
analysis is analogous to Hathcock's requirement, under the third exception, that
use
public
the
satisfy
independently
must
itself
property
reason for condemning the
"if
requirement. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783. As noted by Justice O'Connor,
transfer
render
to
enough
are
side-effects
positive
predicted (or even guaranteed)
do
from one private party to another constitutional, then the words 'for public use'
the
on
constraint
any
exert
not
do
thus
and
takings,
any
not realistically exclude
eminent domain power." Kelo, 545 U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
67 See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing traditional and contemporary meanings of the
term "blight").
68 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784.
69 See id.; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 (explaining that public problems
subject to the traditional application of police power, such as "[p]ublic safety, public
health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order," are legitimate areas for the
exercise of eminent domain). In a rather blunt analogy, the Berman Court remarked
may
that "[t]he misery of [slum] housing may despoil a community as an open sewer
ruin a river." Id. at 33.
64
65
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very opportunistic interpretations of the word "blight" and the
70
term "public use."
1. Berman's Transformation of "Public Use" to "Public Purpose"
Prior to Berman, with a few exceptions, private property
could only be taken through eminent domain for traditional
public uses, not for "purely private, profit-driven companies." 71
The Berman Court, however, interpreted the term "public use" to
have a meaning of "public purpose," with such purpose to be
determined by the legislature. 72 The public purpose justifying
the takings in Berman was the removal of blight in the form of
slum housing. 73 The Berman opinion is filled with broad rhetoric
about the pressing need to revitalize the country's areas. 74 Such
a utopian view of the government's ability to solve the social ills
of urban dwellings was likely a product of the times, 75 but the
rationale has carried forward to modern day takings and the
term "blight" has been unjustifiably expanded to meet the goals
of economically strapped states and municipalities. 76
70 At least with respect to the United Sates Constitution, Kelo eliminates the
need for state legislatures to manipulate the term "blight" because economic
development has been deemed a public use. See Kelo, 545 U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
Therefore, only legislatures in states, such as Michigan, with protectively
interpreted constitutions need to contrive the meaning of blight to exercise
opportunistic eminent domain.
71 See Scott Bullock, Narrow 'Public Use,'NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 23.
72 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 34; see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2663
(discussing and approving of Berman's deference to the state legislature in its
determination of the efficacy of a taking that confiscated both blighted and nonblighted property as part of a community redevelopment program); Bullock, supra
note 71.
73 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33.
74 See
id.
at 32
(stating that
"[m]iserable
and
disreputable
housing ... suffocate[s] the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status
of cattle"). The Berman Court also stated that "[i]t is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 33.
75 See Bullock, supra note 71 (noting that the Berman Court was influenced
by
"the post-New Deal, post-World War II optimism in the ability of the government to
centrally plan urban areas" and to solve most social problems facing the public).
76 Incidentally, most of the urban renewal projects did not work out the way the
post-New Deal optimists had planned. See id. ("[S]lum clearance efforts of the 1950s
and 1960s turned out to be public-policy disasters, leading to the wholesale
demolition and destruction of many communities from which cities have yet to
recover."). Furthermore, commentators have equated the adverse effect on minority
populations of urban renewal projects with, in the uncivilized words of the past,
"Negro removal." See id. For a discussion on how urban renewal programs have
played a significant role in impeding racial integration by disproportionately
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2. Blight Is in the Eye of the Beholder
Even if one subscribes to the theory that the public benefit
requirement will suffice in situations of bona fide slum
clearance, 77 this exception still leaves the door open to legislative
abuse. On its face, this requirement may appear to protect those
living in what most would consider non-blighted residential
homes. But therein lies the key shortcoming of the Hathcock
ruling: just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, the third
exception solely depends on what the legislature deems to be
blighted property. 78 Just because an area is deemed to be a
blight on the community does not necessarily mean it is so.
Traditionally, the term "blighted" meant that the property was so
relocating minority populations, see Pritchett, supra note 5, at 6 ("Berman was
decided just six months after Brown v.Board of Education [347 U.S. 483 (1954)], but
while Brown receives more attention, Berman was equally influential in shaping
American race relations."). It is ironic that the Supreme Court's rationale in Brown
represented a mistrust of local government to safeguard minority interests, while
Berman's rationale shows an almost complete confidence in those same local
governments to act in a non-discriminatory manner towards those same minorities'
property rights. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("[Tjhe legislature, not the judiciary, is
the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation ....); see
also Pritchett, supra note 5, at 46-47.
77 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.* (stating that the term "[s]ubstandard housing
conditions" includes "lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or [the presence]
of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty interior arrangement, or any combination of
these factors."' (quoting D.C. CODE §§ 5-701-5-719 (1951))). In Berman, the buildings
in the "Washington, D.C., neighborhood were beyond repair." Berliner, supra note
39. Most of the homes lacked plumbing and the "residents suffered from high rates
of crime, syphilis, and infant mortality." Id. Berliner suggests that "[t]he
neighborhood probably could have been condemned as a nuisance or hazardous to
the pubic health." Id.
78 See Editorial, Let There Be Blight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2004, at A18
(explaining that legislatures are quick to characterize choice property as blighted).
Because businesses will always pay governments more than homeowners
(and large businesses will yield more than small), it's no coincidence that
governments tend to invoke eminent domain powers on behalf of the rich
and politically well-connected at the expense of the mom-and-pop shop or
the family that simply wants to keep the home it's lived in for generations.
Id. The threat of opportunistic blight designations by local legislatures is especially
dangerous given the reluctance of courts to employ meaningful judicial review in
cases of eminent domain. See infra Part II (discussing the need for more significant
judicial review); see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The beneficiaries [of eminent domain] are
likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms."). Justice O'Connor
also pointed out that with the ruling of the majority in Kelo, "the government now
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more."
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run down and dilapidated that its mere presence would
constitute a public nuisance. 79 In the past few decades, however,
"it has become common for city [and community] leaders to define
'blighted' as: 'Not developed as nicely as we'd prefer' [or] '[n]ot
developed by the people we'd prefer."'8 0 Hence, a tax-hungry
Michigan city can condemn private property pursuant to the
economic development rationale, which was seemingly overruled
by Hathcock, as long as it is done under the guise of clearing
8
blight. '
New York is one of the worst states in the country for
abusing eminent domain under the pretext of eliminating
blight.8 2 For example, in West 41st Street Realty LLC v. New
York State Urban Development Corp.,83 the Empire State
Development Corporation (the "ESDC")84 planned to condemn an
entire city block in Times Square to make way for a new fiftytwo-story office tower that would serve as the new headquarters
for the New York Times, as well as provide 700,000 square feet of
79 See Jonathan Rauch, Taking Property:Bush's Landgrab-andthe
New York
Times,' NAT'L J., July 26, 2002, available at http://www.reason.com/rauch/
072902.shtml; see also Berliner, supra note 39 (describing the conditions of the
condemned property in Berman).
80 Rauch, supra note 79; see also Berliner, supra note 39 (suggesting that some
state legislatures have come to include in their definition of "blight" a building that
merely lacks parking or central air conditioning).
81 The Hathcock court stated that "Poletown's'economic benefit' rationale
would
validate practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a
private entity." County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 786 (Mich. 2004). It
seems as though the court's "public good exception," when used to characterize
middle-class, non-slum homes as blighted, gives municipal legislatures the same
unfettered discretion as does the "economic benefit" rationale. Troublingly, this
means that the ability to take private property depends on the definition of blight
employed by the government representatives proposing use of eminent domain. See
supra note 63 (discussing how the United States Supreme Court in Kelo did not
address the dilemma of opportunistic blight designations). As stated above, the
modern trend of designating homes that present no public hazard or nuisance as
blighted is a legislative alternative to facing litigation on the meaning of the public
use clause in the relevant state constitution. See supra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text.
92 See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 144 (explaining how, between
1998 and 2002,
New York has used at least fourteen private use projects to condemn the property of
at least fifty-seven businesses).
83 298 A.D.2d 1, 744 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 2002).
84 The ESDC is a subsidiary of the New York State Urban
Development
Corporation, which was created to engage in a variety of activities to facilitate the
acquisition, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, or improvement of
industrial, manufacturing, and commercial facilities. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §
6252 (McKinney 2000).
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office space to other well-heeled tenants.8 5 In order to proceed
with the proposed condemnation, the ESDC was required by law
to find that the property constituted blight in the Times Square
vicinity.8 6
Although the office buildings on the proposed
condemnation site were not trendy or home to chic urban
periodicals, they were still considered profitable parcels of
commercial real estate to their owners.8 7 Nevertheless, the
ESDC ultimately found that the properties were statutorily
blighted and entered into discussions with the New York Times
88
to negotiate a rather favorable selling price.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First
Department, noting that its scope of review was narrow,8 9 upheld
the use of eminent domain because the property in question,
which was home to many commercially productive businesses,
was a "pernicious blight."9° Essentially, the court refused to stay
the condemnations because the property was deemed to be
blighted by the legislature, which plainly acted pursuant to an
economic development rationale as opposed to ridding the city of

85 See W 41st St. Realty, 298 A.D.2d at 5, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 124 (describing the
details of the New York Times headquarters project); see also BERLINER, supra note
1, at 146-47.
86 When considering land use improvement projects, the ESDC is required to
find that the proposed project site is substandard or unsanitary and impairs sound
growth and development of the municipality. See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 6260.
87 See BERLINER, supra note 1, at 147 (noting that some of the tenants in the
buildings proposed to be condemned by the ESDC included Arnold Hatters, B&J
Fabrics, and more than thirty other prosperous businesses); David W. Dunlap,
Blight to Some Is Home to Others: Concern Over Displacement by a New Times
Building, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at D1 (illustrating the profitable businesses
that would be displaced to accommodate the New York Times building). In any
event, the property certainly did not constitute a public nuisance, as would
seemingly be required by the Berman rationale. See supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text. Absent New York's statutory requirements of blight, however,
the United States Constitution merely requires a "carefully considered" economic
development plan. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2661 (2005).
88 The price secured by the New York Times for the property was "$84.94
million, or $62 per square foot, compared with $130 per square foot paid in a private
transaction for a nearby parcel." BERLINER, supra note 1, at 147.
89 See W. 41st St. Realty, 298 A.D.2d at 6, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 125 ("The scope of our
review is necessarily narrow since this exercise of the eminent domain power is a
legislative function.").
90 See id. at 7, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 126 ('Virtually all of the anticipated outcomes of
this project clearly serve a public purpose by eliminating a pernicious blight which
has impaired the economic development of a midtown Manhattan neighborhood.").
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a public nuisance. 91 Prime commercial real estate in Times
Square being used for legitimate and profitable business
purposes can hardly be deemed blighted, even if the legislature
feels a different use of the land would economically invigorate the
city.
Unfortunately, the Hathcock court did not have the
opportunity to address this dilemma directly because the Wayne
County legislature did not even attempt to classify the property
as blighted, choosing instead to condemn the property solely on
92
the basis of an economic development rationale.
II. THE NEED FOR GREATER JUDICIAL REVIEW

Although Hathcock has pleased many commentators for its
prohibition on the use of eminent domain for a stated economic
development rationale, 93 legislatures can apparently circumvent
such a ruling by simply characterizing private property as
blighted. 94 A primary way for legislatures to be held accountable
91 Ironically, the New York Times has taken a strong editorial position against
such legislative economic development projects that take non-blighted private
property from individuals for the benefit of private corporations. See, e.g., Nicholas
D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Bush and the Texas Land Grab, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at
A17 (harshly criticizing President George W. Bush for a business deal in which he
negotiated with a Texas municipality to acquire land through eminent domain for
the Texas Rangers, a Major League Baseball organization of which Bush was a partowner); see also Rauch, supra note 79 (sarcastically noting that what made this land
acquisition so scandalous was the fact that Bush and his associates were in fact
playing within the rules).
92 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 775-76 (Mich. 2004). In
dictum, however, the court did qualify eminent domain used for the removal of
blight as necessarily being "for the sake of public health and safety." See id. at 783.
The ESDC of New York, exemplifying the problem of using "blight" and "economic
development" interchangeably, never purported to condemn the property in Times
Square for purposes of public health and safety. See W. 41st St. Realty, 298 A.D.2d at
6-7, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26. The Kelo Court also neglected to address this problem
because the facts before the Court were nearly identical to that of Hathcock. See
Kelo, 545 U.S. at __,125 S. Ct. at 2658-60.
93 See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Court Restores Sanctity of Property Rights,
DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004, at 10 (praising the Michigan Supreme Court for
"turn[ing] back the clock and restor[ing] a vital civil liberty" by overruling Poletown).
94 See Goldstein & Rikon, supra note 6 (suggesting that Hathcock will make
very little difference in how properties are taken because many abuses of eminent
domain are based on findings of blight, not on the economic development rationale).
Such findings of blight will presumably fit into the Hathcock court's public good
exception, even though the takings may very well be based on their economic benefit
to the city and its local economy. See id.; see also infra Part I.C.2 (explaining and
giving examples of the use of the blight rationale in place of an economic
development justification). Of course, in the wake of Kelo, a state legislature will
only face this problem in a state that statutorily or judicially prevents the exercise of
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to an objective meaning of public use-which includes a
definition of blight that incorporates legitimate removal "for the
sake of public health and safety,"95-is for state courts to cease
the abdication of their duty to provide meaningful judicial review
of eminent domain used (or rather abused) for the benefit of
private entities.9 6 Unfortunately, many courts, including the
lower courts in the Hathcock case, and even the United States
Supreme Court in Kelo, simply avoid the questions of public use
by putting forth the proposition that their hands are tied by the
97
legislature.
Much of the apprehensiveness on the part of the state courts
to invalidate economic development takings has come from
reliance on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
last case prior to Kelo in which the Supreme Court directly
addressed the federal Public Use Clause was Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.98 There, the Court upheld the use of
eminent domain to redistribute ownership of real property in
Hawaii from an oligarchy of landowners to the general public. 99
However, the Court cited Berman as guidance for the principle
that the role of the judiciary "in reviewing a legislature's
judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when the
eminent domain power is equated with the police power... is 'an

eminent domain under an economic development rationale.
95 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783.
96 See Goldstein & Rikon, supra note 6 (stating that "[i]f the abuses of the use of
the power of eminent domain are to be effectively contained.., the courts have to be
given a broader role in the process"). According to Justice O'Connor, the United
States Supreme Court did "abdicate" its responsibility in Kelo. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at
__,125 S.Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 785; cf. Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 475 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding
explicit legislative findings, this Court has always made an independent
determination of what constitutes a public use for which the power of eminent
domain may be utilized."), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765 (Mich. 2004). The Hathcock court agreed with Justice Ryan's view, but neglected
to expand the thought any further. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 785.
98 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
99 See id. at 233. Under Hawaii's condemnation scheme, tenants who lived on
single-family residential lots within development tracts of at least five acres were
entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn the property on which
they lived. Id. at 233. The facts of Midkiff do not address the concerns of this
Comment, which deal with a legislature taking non-blighted private property from
real property owners of modest means. In Midkiff, the takings adversely affected
seventy-two private landowners who cumulatively owned 47% of the land in Hawaii.
See id. at 232.
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extremely narrow' one." 100 Likewise, the Kelo Court reasoned
that the Court's jurisprudence on eminent domain has evolved to
a point where now state legislatures are the primary source for
construing the definition of public use. 10 1 This argument, of
course, assumes that the legislature's definition of public use or
blight is such that the state action would be considered
legitimate by the citizens who elected the present government
representatives. Given the significant barriers to attacking the
findings of fact which lead to condemnation, 10 2 the public should
have greater protection than merely the political process, which
is exercised intermittently at the polls.
Especially with
legislatures armed with Kelo, state courts must exercise greater
power of review to prevent the abuse of eminent domain being
used for economic development, either blatantly or under the
guise of blight clearance.

100Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (holding that
judicial review was "extremely narrow" in determining whether a legislature's
definition of public use passed constitutional muster)); see also Richard B. Tranter,
Defer to Legislatures, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 23 (arguing that courts, by taking
away the broad discretion of legislatures in condemning private property, will
thwart efforts for urban redevelopment and grant private citizens "the right to veto
legitimate state action [instead of merely acquiring] the right to just compensation").
101 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at _125 S. Ct. at 2664 ("[O]ur public use jurisprudence
has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording
legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
takings power.").
102 See Goldstein & Rikon, supra note 6; see also N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW §
202 (McKinney 2003). Owners of private property in New York are given public
notice in a newspaper listing that a public hearing will take place on the taking of
their property. Id. Owners receive no phone call, mail, or fax telling them about the
hearing. At the hearing, which is conducted by the very government entity that is
trying to take the property, owners cannot ask questions or call witnesses, and may
only speak for a "reasonable" time. Id. § 203. Next, owners are not notified of the
government's determination that their property can be taken at some time in the
future. Owners whose property is being taken have a right to appeal the
determination, but no one notifies them of this right to appeal, and they only have
thirty days after the publication of the determination to somehow figure out that
this right exists and to file papers in court. Id. § 207. If an owner does not appeal, he
or she loses all rights to challenge the constitutionality of the taking and can never
challenge the government's purpose. Id.; see also Minnich v. Gargano, No. 00 Civ.
7481, 2001 WL 46989 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2001) (upholding New York's rapid and
perplexing condemnation proceedings); Marni Soupcoff, New York Eminent Domain
Laws Kafkaesque, INTELL.
AMMUNITION,
Mar.
1,
2001,
available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=96 (pointing out the lack of notice and
general unfairness of New York's eminent domain proceedings).
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CONCLUSION

The Hathcock court properly pointed out that there is
virtually no limit to eminent domain under the economic
development rationale. Moreover, as put by Justice O'Connor in
her Kelo dissent, "Today nearly all real property is susceptible to
condemnation on the Court's theory."'10 3 A government can
always envision a more lucrative use for most privately owned
property. 10 4 With the Kelo decision ringing the death knell of the
federal Public Use Clause, now only the states have the power to
protect private property from abusive takings. However, leaving
the door open for legislatures to arbitrarily deem property as
"blighted" provides little assurance to real estate owners that
their land will not be condemned for some economic purpose
under the guise of blight clearance.
Those affected can use the political process to remove the
representatives who propose to abuse the power of eminent
domain under an economic development rationale. In fact, as a
result of the Kelo ruling and the rise in abuse by municipal
legislatures, public backlash to excessive takings is on the rise
and the formation of grassroots efforts to pass statutory
The Kelo effect should not be
protection has begun. 10 5
underestimated. 0 6 Politicians are poised to act, demonstrated by
Kelo, 545 U.S.at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See Berliner, supra note 39 ("Businesses inevitably generate more jobs than
private homes, and big companies pay higher taxes than small companies.").
105 See Connecticut Tea Party, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2005, at A14 (describing
how the Kelo ruling has spurned a "grassroots movement" across the country to
press local governments to statutorily or constitutionally curtail their unlimited
eminent domain powers). Even the Governor of Connecticut, Jodi Rell, has changed
her tune. Immediately after Kelo, she benignly spoke of a need 'to strike a right
balance between property rights and economic development."' Id. (quoting Governor
Jodi Rell). Now, after significant public backlash to Kelo, she characterizes eminent
domain as "the [twenty-first] century equivalent of the Boston Tea Party." Id.
(quoting Governor Jodi Rell); see also Adam Karlin, Property Seizure Backlash,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 6, 2005, at 1 (summarizing the widespread
backlash against Kelo by citizens, politicians, and private organizations).
106 See Inst. for Justice, Grassroots Groundswell Grows Against Eminent
Domain Abuse (July 12, 2005), http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticutl
7_12_05pr.html (showing that state legislators in Connecticut have been pressured
into calling for a moratorium on the use of eminent domain by all Connecticut cities
until the law can be revised to grant more protection to property owners); see also
John Tierney, Making Roberts Talk, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2005, at A31 (explaining
how after Justice Souter's endorsement of economic development takings in Kelo, a
group in Weare, New Hampshire proposed raising local tax revenue by condemning
and taking Souter's home so a developer could build a private resort called the 'Lost
103
104
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the introduction in Congress of two pieces of legislation designed
to undo the effect of Kelo, 10 7 and with state legislators moving for
constitutional amendments prohibiting eminent domain for
private development. 108 Kelo has opened the eyes of many
politicians, conservative and liberal, to the potential misuses of
eminent domain.109
The United States Supreme Court can remedially overrule
Kelo and interpret the federal Public Use Clause literally,
thereby allowing an exception for truly blighted property and
setting a standard to determine if property is really blighted and
not just deemed to be so by an opportunistic legislature. 110 Until
it does, however, Kelo moves the fight to the states. The ruling in
Hathcock sets an example for other states to follow in rejecting
the economic development rationale. But, like plugging one hole
only to gouge out another, because it neglected to address the
definition of "blight," Hathcock leaves ownership of real property
in Michigan essentially in the same position as before:
perpetually threatened by the expansion plans of a profitable
Liberty Hotel").
107 Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) has introduced the "Protection of Homes, Small
Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005," to "prohibit the transfer of private
property without the owners' consent if the transfer is for economic development
rather than public use." Ronald D. Utt, Kelo Backlash Could Lead to Restoration of
Property Rights Lost to Smart Growth and Eminent Domain Abuses, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION WEB MEMO, June 29, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/
SmartGrowth/wm781.cfm; see also Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and
Private Property Act of 2005, S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005). Likewise, House Judiciary
Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) plans to introduce the "Private Property
Rights Protection Act," which is intended "to restore the property rights of all
Americans the Supreme Court took away on June 23." Utt, supra; see also Private
Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3135, 109th Cong. (2005).
108 See Inst. for Justice, supra note 106 (stating that legislators are assembling
support for constitutional amendments in Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, New Jersey,
and Michigan).
109 Even Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA), hardly a proponent of
conservative ideology, has expressed her displeasure with the Kelo ruling, stating
that '[g]overnment should be in the business of protecting private property."' Rich
Lowry, "Mad Max" Stands with the Right, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.comlowry/lowry20050805O737.asp (quoting Rep. Maxine
Waters). Representative Waters is rightly concerned that, as with the urban renewal
projects of the mid-twentieth century, economic development takings can easily be
used to remove poor, minority property owners who "don't have the wherewithal to
fight back." Id.; see also supra note 76 (discussing the historical effects of urban
renewal on minority populations).
110 As discussed in note 63, however, the Court need not address the problems
outlined in Part I.C concerning opportunistic blight designations, and did not
address such problems in Kelo.
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enterprise that can provide greater tax proceeds to a legislature
promising ever more spending to its constituents. In a country
that values property rights as much as life and liberty, it is
essential that eminent domain be justified by a more legitimate
rationale than mere economic development.
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